IT would seem to be a self-evident proposition that psychology and psychiatry should be intimately associated and indeed mutually dependent upon one another. Psychiatry is the study of mental disorder, its aim the elucidation and control of morbid mental processes, and surely no progress can be made along this road without the help of psychology, whose kingdom any investigation of mental process must inevitably traverse. Yet when we examine the history and achievements of psychiatry our faith in this self-evident proposition cannot but be shaken. It is true that in every textbook we find a description of the phenomena of mental disorder which is couched in psychological terms, and often a preliminary chapter in which the phenomena are classified into psychological categories. But when an attempt is made to pass beyond this purely descriptive level and to seek the causal processes responsible for the phenomena, psychology is often abandoned altogether, and those causal processes sought in the fields of physiology and chemistry. There is clearly an underlying implication that psychology cannot offer causal conceptions of any value, and that the psychological series constitutes merely a surface froth, beneath which lie solid realities of an altogether different character, realities which can only be appraised and investigated by the weapons of other sciences. Sometimes this view is explicitly and uncompromisingly stated, without even that superficial courtesy to psychology which is to be found in the majority of textbooks. Lewis Bruce, for example, in the preface to his "Studies in Clinical Psychiatry," says: "When psychology is divorced from psychiatry, and the study of psychiatry is prosecuted along the lines of advance in general medicine, our knowledge of mental diseases cannot fail to be added to. The matter contained in the following pages is based on wvork so conducted; psychology is omitted.1
Bruce, for example, in the preface to his "Studies in Clinical Psychiatry," says: "When psychology is divorced from psychiatry, and the study of psychiatry is prosecuted along the lines of advance in general medicine, our knowledge of mental diseases cannot fail to be added to. The matter contained in the following pages is based on wvork so conducted; psychology is omitted.1
Here is a statement coming from an authoritative source, and yet appearing to traverse completely the self-evident proposition with which we commenced. There is ground, therefore, for examining this proposition, for investigating the part which psychology has so far played in the development of psychiatry, and for estimating the place which it may legitimately hope to occupy in the future. The aim of the present address is to move some way' along this road, and we shall find that our course will follow mainly the lines of a critical review, but with occasional digressions into philosophy and even into the regions of frank speculation.
As a preliminary measure it will be necessary to be clear in our minds as to the precise meaning to be attached to this word "psychology," because we may already suspect that some ambiguity must underlie the flagrant contradiction between our self-evident proposition and such a statement as that put forward by Lewis Bruce. "Psychology " is indeed used in two senses which, though of course related, are essentially distinct in their significance. On the one hand it denotes concern with a particular group of phenomena, the group to which the terms "mental" and "subjective" may also be applied. We use the term in this sense, for example, when we describe the delusions of a patient and call it a psychological description. On the other hand, psychology means an attempt to explain the behaviour and mental processes of a patient by conceptions built out of the stuff of subjective experience. In this sense, for example, we speak of a psychological interpretation when we regard an hysterical hemiplegia as the end-result of a chain of mental processes conceived to interact according to precise psychological laws. In the first or descriptive sense, psychology is of course employed by every psychiatrist, and it is possible that this is the only meaning for which our self-evident proposition may have vaiidity. It is in the second or causal sense that Lewis Bruce denies to psychology any useful place in the sphere of psychiatry. For those who think with him, causal processes can only exist in the physiological chain which underlies the superficial mental phenomenon, and only this can yield results to scientific research. The meaning and relationship of the two senses in which the term psychology is used can best be appreciated by considering the place which they occupy in the method of science. Every science advances through three stages. Firstly, there is the enumeration and collection of observed phenomena. Secondly, there is the classification into groups of the phenomena which have been observed. Thirdly, there is the endeavour to discover causal processes acting according to definite laws, which will explain the incidence of future phenomena. A science which has not passed beyond the first two stages is said to be at a merely descriptive level. This level is of immense importance, because it forms the solid platform upon which the third stagehas to be built, but it is the third stage which constitutes the great edifice of modern science, and we should now hardly dignify with the name of science any body of knowledge which had not succeeded in building at least some stories of this edifice.
All psychiatrists are prepared to take cognizance of psychology so far as the first stage is concerned, and almost all move on to the second stage of classification. The strict behaviourist will be an exception here, because he declines to regard conscious phenomena at all, and certainly does not consider them as worth classifying. Many psychiatrists who are not behaviourists, however, refuse absolutely to follow a psychological path beyond the second stage, and hold that anatomical, physiological, and chemical investigations alone offer any hope of progress. It is clearly of fundamental importance that this claim should be examined, and a decision reached as to whether psychology is for the psychiatrist merely an ignis fatutts, or a scientifically valid approach to the problems with which he is concerned.
As a first step it will be helpful to consider the history of the psychological approach in psychiatry, and the contributions which psychology has hitherto been able to offer. We need not concern ourselves with those remote conceptions of mental disorder in which the phenomena were explained as due to possession by malignant or benevolent spirits, because, although it is true that the explanation is couched in terms of conscious processes, it has not been reached by the method of science, and therefore has played no part in the development of scientific psychiatry.
In the earliest writings which strove to follow the road of science, we find that enumeration of observed phenomena which we have recognized as the first stage of science, accompanied by such classification as the psychology of the day was able to offer. The symptoms were divided into groups according as they affected the three great faculties of cognition, emotion, and volition, and with the development of academic psychology further subdivisions were made into groups affecting sensation, perception, judgment, and so on. In this way hallucinations, delusions, obsessions and other morbid processes were marked out, and finally a mass of symptoms were recorded and classified which seemed to cover all the observable phenomena of mental disorder. This level of development was that characterizing every science which has not passed beyond a purely descriptive stage, and in psychiatry any attempt to proceed further was beset with extraordinary difficulties. These difficulties are still with us, and though many valiant efforts have been made, they have certainly not yet been overcome in any entirely satisfactory manner. To the earlier psychiatrists it seemed reasonable to suppose that the line of advance must lie along the road which had proved successful in general medicine. There, the recording of phenomena had been followed by the observation that phenomena tended to occur in a certain association or setting, and thereby to belong to an entity to which the term " disease " was applied. Observations of this kind had proved to have great value, because they enabled the physician to predict, and perhaps even to control, the course and consequences likely to follow a given clinical picture. The psychiatrist, therefore, naturally strove to follow the same model, and to fashion disease entities out of the mass of phenomena before him. His material, however, showed itself remarkably resistant to attack from this angle. The symptoms of mental disorder grouped themselves in all sorts and kinds of ways, now in one setting and now in another, and formed a series of kaleidoscopic pictures rather than the comparatively coherent and stable groups found in general medicine. In this impasse, and convinced that classification into disease entities was an essential step for progress, the psychiatrist took the desperate step of manufacturing disease entities instead of discovering them. Hence there arose the symptomatological classification which clogged the steps of psychiatry for a long period, and which has many unfortunate repercussions even in our own time.
This system was based upon the manoeuvre of selecting the most prominent psychological symptoms which the patient happened to display, hypotbecating a disease characterized by the symptoms in question, and deriving comfort from the statement that the patient was suffering from that disease. For example, if we construct a disease characterized by the symptom of depression and call it melancholia, then we have the advantage of being able to diagnose without difficulty all those cases in which depression is a marked feature. The advantage is of course illusory, because classification is not an end in itself, and diagnosis only has value if it enables us to predicate something about the course and future of the illness, and the means appropriate to combat it. Naturally a diagnosis based on an arbitrary ball-mark can do none of these things, and is therefore useless. A symptomatological diagnosis of melancholia permits us to infer that the patient is depressed, just this and no more.
The futility of the symptomatological classification was glaringly apparent, but it created a false semblance of knowledge where none existed; because of this very fact it managed to thrive, and even to-day it still lingers in the backwaters of psychiatry, Those investigators who could not comfort themselves with mere words, however, realized that progress lhere was impossible, and sought for some other road. The psychological approach seemed to have led nowhere, and attention was therefore turned to the anatomical, physiological and chemical processes which were conceived to lie behind the surface phenomena. If we put this into the language of scientific method, it may be said that the psychologist was permitted to record the phenomena of psychiatry and to attempt a crude grouping of those phenomena, but that beyond the first two stages of the method of science he could not go. Any progress towards the third stage of causal conceptions had to be left to the physiologist and the chemist. This discarding of psychology was conditioned, not only by its conspicuous failure to assist, but by the materialism which dominated the earlier history of science, and which believed science to be solely concerned with the solid realities of the physical universe.
It may be pointed out that the failure of psychology had actually been due, not to its intrinsic defects, but to ignorance of its possibilities as a scientific weapon, and the faulty method of approach in which it had been sought to use it. The conception of disease entities held the field, and the miscarriage of all attempts to fit the psychological phenomena of psychiatry into this conception was attributed to the futility of psychology, rather than to the intrinsic characters of the material with which it had to deal. Mental diseases comparable to the diseases of general medicine had to exist, and if the psychologist could not discover them, the task could only be handed over to more competent hands. The notion that disease entities played only an indirect part in mental disorder did not dawn upon psychiatry until recent years, when the futile search for the non-existent was replaced by the conception of reaction types, and incidentally a path opened along which psychology could make a real advance.
Before dealing with these later developments, however, it is necessary to consider a landmark of fundamental importance in the progress of psychiatry, the work of Kraepelin. This lay along the line of the psychological approach, but diverged radically from the morass into which the symptomatological classification had plunged. Kraepelin sought to classify mental disorders by their course rather than by the transitory clinical pictures which they happened to present. He studied them, that is to say, longitudinally, instead of in transverse sections. By this method he succeeded in carving out of the mass of psychiatric phenomena the conditions which he termed manic-depressive insanity and dementia praecox, characterized essentially by the course which they tended to follow. Further, he was able to show that examples of these two disorders presented clinical pictures, varying considerably from one time to another, but always manifesting certain features which enabled the observer to assign the case to the disorder to which it belonged. This correlation of transitory clinical picture with probable course was a notable achievement, because it permitted the physician to forecast the future of the patient and hence to attain one of the great goals of medicine.
Kraepelin's work gave rise to the hope that the method he had initiated would open up a great field of profitable research, and that ultimately the whole sphere of psychiatry would be mapped out into well-defined disorders. This hope has not been realized, however, and Kraepelin's further investigations led him towards a continuous dividing and subdividing of dementia praecox and manic-depressive insanity into a multitude of varieties, an orgy of pigeon-holing hardly more profitable than the fantastic creations of the old symptomatological classification. We have indeed come to attach a far less definite significance to Kraepelin's major groups of dementia praecox and manic-depressive insanity than he himself believed them to possess, though they remain generalizations of great value and importance. This is because the more fertile conception of reaction types has replaced the older notion of disease entities. It is Kraepelin's adherence to that older notion which explains the success which he was able to achieve, but it also explains the fact that he found all further progress blocked.
If we revert now to our main thesis, the relation of psychology to psychiatry, Kraepelin's place in regard thereto is easily defined. He recorded the phenomena he observed in psychological terms, and maintained a psychological point of view in the classification which he devised. His longitudinal approach, moreover, broke down the old symptomatological impasse, and showed that the second stage of scientific method could be achieved without abandoning psychology and employing other weapons of attack. It is beyond question, indeed, that he cleared the ground for psychology, and that he opened a road in psydhiatry along which psychology has been able to make a notable progress; but he did not himself move along that road.
His psychological work remained altogether at the level of a descriptive science, and he whole-heartedly adopted the prevailing view that causal conceptions, the conceptions which mark the third stage of scientific method, had to be sought in anatomy, physiology and chemistry.
The attempt to advance the psychology of psychiatry to the third stage is indeed an affair of very recent years, and the line of development which ultimately led to it arose altogether outside psychiatry as that term is commonly understood. The history of the application of psychological causal conceptions to the problems of medicine takes us back to the observations of the magnetizers and mesmerists, and to the growth of the conception of suggestion whereby those observations were later interpreted. Only gradually did the view emerge that certain disorders could be regarded as due to psychological processes, and their incidence and course explained by psychological laws. Charcot's remark, that the phenomena of hysteria seemed to be the result of " ideas," was a landmark of great importance, although he himself failed to appreciate its significance and made no attempt to explore the avenue he indicated. The exploration was carried out, however, by two of his pupils, Janet and Freud, and yielded a harvest which has completely altered the orientation of psychology and psychiatry.
The work of Janet was almost altogether devoted to those conditions which we now term the psychoneuroses, and had but little direct contact with the psychoses. It is of interest to note, indeed, that psychology as a weapon of explanation was first applied, not to the psychoses, where the mental factor is glaringly apparent, but to phenomena of a seemingly physical order, such as the anesthesias and paralyses of hysteria. Janet's investigation of these phenomena enabled him to show that they were not merely distinguished by purely negative characters, as had hitherto been described, that is to say the absence of signs which would mark a condition of organic origin; but by positive characters of a quite definite kind. He observed, for example, that an hysterical anaesthesia had a distribution which did not conform to any organic lesion, but which did conform to something of a different order, namely an idea. He followed up this clear indication of a psychological causation, and was able to elicit other factors susceptible of a psychological interpretation. Finally he produced his conception of dissociation, which cast a flood of light on a field which had hitherto remained impenetrably obscure. It is difficult for the younger generation to realize how extraordinarily refreshing Janet's work was to those of us who, brought up on the academic psychology of that day, had tramped through its arid wastes seeking unavailingly for some help in the problems of life and medicine. The conception of dissociation was applied by Janet almost solely to the psychoneuroses, and mainly to hysteria, the condition most easily explicable thereby, and one indeed in which Janet considered dissociation to be a pathognomonic character. In a modified form, a " molecular " as opposed to a " molar dissociation, he extended the conception to psychasthenia, an entity which he devised in an attempt to -unify almost all non-hysterical neurotic manifestations into a single disorder. This attempt at unification has not survived further investigation, and the heterogeneous collection of states which he included therein are now regarded as comprising a number of essentially distinct conditions. In any case the conception of dissociation was found here to be a far less valuable weapon of explanation and understanding than in hysteria.
It has been said that Janet's work has but little direct contact with the psychoses, and therefore lies largely out of the road with which we are mainly concerned in this address. Nevertheless its indirect influence has naturally been considerable. The conception of dissociation could easily be extended to the phenomena of t.he psychoses. Hallucinations, delusions and the bizarre utterances of dementia pracox could be regarded as manifestations of dissociated currents running contemporaneously in the field of consciousness, and some understanding thereby reached both of their peculiarity of structure and of their imperviousness to influences either from without or within. The chaos of mental processes, before which one could hitherto only stand in helpless bewilderment and repeat the dictiim of Polonius " to define true madness, what is't but to be nothing else but mad? " immediately became less unintelligible and grotesque, and the way was paved for further investigation of their meaning and purpose.
For this further investigation we must turn to the work of Freud, and we must indeed regard as the very essence of Freud's contribution to psychiatry his systematic attempt to apply to its phenomena the concepts of meaning and purpose. Before dealing with the psychiatric aspect, however, it will be necessary to consider for a moment Freud's general line of advance, and the significance which the new viewpoint he introduced has had for psychological medicine. Like Janet, Freud devoted his researches in the first place to the psychoneuroses and, although he soon found that the paths which he was exploring occasionally led him into the sphere of the psychoses, and he ultimately indeed made a far more definite attack upon that sphere than Janet had ever attempted, the main structure of his work has been built around the psychoneuroses.
The chief character of this structure is that Freud introduces dynamic concepts while still remaining within the psychological field. He did not confine himself to those first two stages of science, the observation and classification of phenomena, which had hitherto constituted almost the only ground in which the psychologist was allowed to play. He advanced to a third stage, the construction of causal concepts designed to explain the observed phenomena; moreover these concepts were built out of psychological stuff, and not handed over in despair to the ministrations of the physiologist and the chemist. This was an epoch-making step and one which, if it can be established, at once raises psychology to a level with the other scientific disciplines which serve psychiatry. It is unnecessary to outline here the well-known story of Freud's development, and only certain broad features will be mentioned which have special significance for our present purpose. In seeking to achieve a causal understanding of the phenomena of the psychoneuroses, Freud found, as all his predecessors had found, that the conscious contents of the mind could not contain their own explanation, and that somehow or other we had to get beyond them. He believed, however, that it was possible to get beyond them without leaving the sphere of psychology.
In the first place he maintained that mind and consciousness were not synonymous, and that the contents of the mind included not only conscious, but also preconscious and unconscious processes. Next he devised a number of conceptions and laws, such as conflict and the various mechanisms, and by their aid he was able to show that the phenomena observed could be interpreted psychologically. To account for the psychical activities he had to postulate dynamic factors analogous to the" forces " of physics, and found them in certain instinctual urges which fell into two broad groups, on the one hand the " libido,"and on the other the activities of the ego. In the further course of his investigations he gradually built up a number of conceptions, the superego, the id, and so forth, and has finally produced a complex picture of entities acting and interacting according to fairly precisely defined laws, by which he believes it possible to explain, not only the phenomena of the psychoneuroses and psychoses, but also a considerable part of the general activities of thehuman organism. In this complex picture such notions as the ego, the super-ego, and the id, are obviously conceptual constructs of the kind with which we are familiar in physics and other sciences, and I should personally also include in this category Freud's notion of the unconscious. My psycho-analytical friends, however, have frequently castigated me for expressing this latter view, and stoutly maintain that unconscious processes are of precisely the same order as conscious processes. Probably the difference between us can ultimately be resolved into a question of words and philosophical distinctions without much practical significance, and in any case the point has certainly no importance for our present purpose.
It is only necessary here that we should emphasize once more the momentous nature of the advance which Freud attempted, and its paramount significance in the history of psychological medicine. He refused to accept the traditional limitation of psychology to the merely descriptive levels of science, and insisted that psychology could furnish causal conceptions capable of explaining many of the phenomena of medicine, particularly phenomena which had proved peculiarly resistant to every other line of attack. Finally he produced a body of theory and practice which, however faulty it may ultimately prove to be, and however it may be battered in the slow future growth of knowledge, will remain the first consistent attempt to apply to medicine a conceptual psychology built along the lines which have proved so fertile in other branches of science, and which has at least cast more light upon the problems of neurotic disorder than any other method of approach has yet achieved. It is clear that, if Freud can be held to have succeeded in his venture, he will already have answered the question posed at the beginning of this address, the question as to the part which psychology may legitimately claim in psychiatry. For the moment, however, we must postpone the further discussion of this aspect until we have considered briefly the contribution which Freud has brought to the study of the psychoses.
This contribution has been admirably surveyed by Dr. Rickman, who has provided a detailed analysis of the work which Freud and his school have carried out in this sphere.2 Freud first dealt with the psychoses in a paper published in 1894. He propounded the hypothesis that in certain cases of " hallucinatory confusion" there is a rejection by the ego of an unbearable idea with its associated affect, the idea nevertheless contriving to manifest itself by an hallucinatory manifestation, while the ego, having defended itself from this idea by a " flight into psychosis," has also been compelled to cut loose from reality, totally or in part, because the idea is inseparably bound up with a part of reality. Rickman comments that Freud's formulation in this paper " now seems rather commonplace "; no doubt it does, but in 1894 it was a very remarkable achievement, and one which sketched out in a few broad strokes the essential structure of a framework into which later psychological conceptions of the psychoses have easily fitted.
In 1896 Freud published a paper in which the mechanisms producing the symptoms in hysteria, compulsion neurosis, and paranoia were respectively compared and differentiated, but after this a decade elapsed during which the psycho-analytical school concerned itself with other problems than those of the psychoses. Then came Jung's work on dementia precox, in which he showed that, by the application of Freudian conceptions, the symptoms of that disorder could be interpreted psychologically in an extraordinarily illuminating and refreshing manner. From that time onward the psycho-analytical attack upon the psychoses has been unremitting. In 1908 Abraham brought the libido theory definitely into relation with the psychoses, formulating the view that in dementia pracox there is a destruction of the capacity for transference and object-love, with a return of the libido to the ego, and hence an overestimation of the self with symptoms of a megalomanic type. This line of thought led to the development, in Freud's paper on the Schreber case in 1911, of the conception of narcissism. Here also was put forward the notion that in the psychoses, as in the psychoneuroses, the various disorders were characterized by different but definite arrests and fixations along the road of sexual development, with corresponding differences in the mechanisms whereby the repressed elements were able to manifest themselves. In all -this work the symptomns of the psychoses were ranged in parallel, as it were, with those of the psychoneuroses, and similarly regarded as due to aberrations of libidinal forces.
In this same paper, however, Freud comments that the disturbances in the libido may be secondary to abnormal changes in the ego, and that processes of this kind may be the distinctive characteristic of psychoses. These changes in the ego have, indeed, been the main object of attack in all the later work upon the psychoses carried out by the psycho-analytical school. The alterations in ego-function which seem to be the hall-mark of the psychoses have been worked out in elaborate detail, the successive advances being brought into relation with the newer conceptions of the ego, the differentiation of the super-ego, the notion of the id, and the other theoretical formulations which have marked the progress of psycho-analysis. It is impossible here to give any description of this later work; it is necessarily iDtricate and completely unintelligible without a full knowledge of its background. We need only note two things. Firstly, that the psycho-analyst of to-dav is prepared to give a psychological interpretation, of course admittedly tentative and imperfect, of the phenomena of the psychoses, those phenomena being shown as the result of forces working according to definite psychological laws. Secondly, that in this interpretation he has found it necessary to employ an increasingly elaborated series of conceptual abstractions. We may comment in passing that there is no objection to this latter process, provided that the conceptual abstractions have been constructed according to the canons of scientific method, and that they are legitimately comparable to the conceptions which characterize all advancing sciences.
We are therefore now in a position to give an answer, although not a final one, to the question with which this address opened. One school of thought, at any rate, claims to be able to employ psychology usefully in the service of psychiatry, not merely at a descriptive level, but as a weapon which will enable us to explain causally the observed phenomena. Moreover, there can be no doubt, that this claim has substantial justification, and that the formulations of the psycho-analyst do enable us to interpret in psychological terms the conditions with which the psychiatrist has to deal. If this is correct, then the scientific validity of these formulations could only be contested on two grounds; on the one hand, facts now known, or later to be discovered, must be shown to be incompatible with them, or on the other hand, other formulations must be shown to be more serviceable. I have dealt with the first ground in my Goulstonian Lectures,3 and need only say here that, although one finally arrived at a position of doubt, it was a position of very benevolent doubt. Something must be added, however, concerning the second ground, the existence of formulations which may be, or which may claim to be, more serviceable.
Although Freud's attack upon the psychoses from the psychological side is the most elaborate and detailed, and historically by far the most important, it is not the only one which demands consideration. Other psychological interpretations have been put forward, which may claim a measure of the same kind of success which Freud is able to claim. Adler, for example, brings the psychoses into line with the general psychological conceptions he has devised to explain the psychoneuroses. He maintains that, while fear of a defect, real or imaginary, may occasion an outbreak of neurotic symptoms as compensations or defences, psychoses tend to appear when the patient feels absolutely checkmated, with no hope of going on. In this way Adler finds that the psychoses can be interpreted as manifestations and aberrations of the will to power, and, although his views are clearly unduly simplistic, it can be conceded that they do cast considerable light on at any rate some of the phenomena with which they are concerned. Jung, again, approaching the subject from a very different standpoint, interprets the psychoses in relation to his basic concepts, which are of course fundamentally distinct from those of Freud and Adler, and he too achieves a measure of success.
Space does not permit of our giving to these various schools any detailed or even adequate consideration, but we may note for our present purpose certain important features. Firstly, Adler and Jung, like Freud, offer causal interpretations of the phenomena, and their interpretations are similarly built on the psychological plane.
Secondly, all these three interpretations differ profoundly one from another. Are we to conclude from this that two at least must necessarily be wrong ? I do not think so, and I shall hope later to offer some justification for this statement. As a preliminary measure, however, it will be necessary to review very briefly some other lines of approach which appear to have a bearing on the problem of the relationship between psychology and psychiatry.
We have already mentioned the work of Janet and the epoch-making part which it played in the history of psychological medicine. We have only to add now that his conceptions, although they ensured a great stride forward, seem to have exhausted their impetus, and have contributed but little further to progress during the course of the present century. The psychological attack has indeed proceeded almost entirely from the three schools of Freud, Adler and Jung. Much work has been produced by authors who belong to none of those three schools, but in the main it has consisted of eclectic modifications, and the fundamental concepts have been borrowed.
The researches of Pavlov, and the immensely important conceptions to which they have led, belong to the sphere of physiology, and the behaviouristic psychology which has-been built upon those conceptions is not psychology in the sense in which that word is employed in this address. It does not attempt to interpret phenomena in terms of subjective experience. On the contrary, it expressly declines to have anything to do with subjective experience, and constructs its conceptions on a mechanistic stimulus-response system, which is clearly and entirely couched in the language of physiology.
Gestalt psychology is in its early youth, and up to the present has mainly concerned itself with phenomena less complex than those which trouble the psychiatrist. It promises to be of great assistance in the future, but one may hazard the conjecture that future developments are likely to lead it rather into the sphere of physiological than psychological conceptions.
Kretschmer's work may be regarded as the formulation of a psychological classification, constructed upon the platform originally built by Jung and others, but with an added correlation with physical characters. Kretschmer's researches have provided us with a most illuminating development of the reaction-type as opposed to the disease-entity system, but they do not strictly constitute a milestone in the march of the psychological conception of disorder. The correlation with physical characters is the crux of the matter here, and the search for causal explanation clearly leads us straight into the physiological field.
Apart from Kretschmer, many other investigators have attempted to link up the psychological and physiological methods of approach, endocrinology and the autonomic nervous system being generally selected as offering promising bridges, but not much solid success has been achieved. The work of Kempf may be specially mentioned here, and it may be noted that Freud's line of attack lends itself to speculations of this kind, because of the fundamental part played in it by the notion of instinctual urges. Such urges can easily be translated into physiological and chemical terms. Freud, indeed, explicitly states that "We regard instinct as being a term situated on the frontier-line between the somatic and the mental, and consider it as denoting the mental representative of organic forces."' In all the approaches which we have hitherto considered some account at least is taken of the psychological phenomena of psychiatry, although in many this stops short at the purely descriptive level, the causal conceptions being sought in other spheres of science. There are other approaches, however, in which even this temporary employment of psychology is excluded, as may be seen in the statement of Lewis Bruce, quoted at the beginning of this address. Here psychological phenomena are not considered at all, but only the anatomical, histological or chemical phenomena which can be observed in psychiatric cases, and upon these the explanatory causal conceptions are exclusively built. There is, of course, no possible objection to this procedure as a method of approach, and it should lead to fruitful results which will increase our understanding. We can hardly believe, however, that an attempt to write Hamlet without introducing the Prince of Denmark will bring us any complete understanding.
We may now attempt to summarize briefly the position so far reached. Mental disorder is being attacked along a number of different avenues, which fall into two broad groups, on the one hand the psychological and on the otber what we will term the physiological, although that word must be understood here to include the chemical and all other allied methods. This second group, though its constituent members differ considerably amongst themselves, are akin in that they all follow the road of objective science, which has proved so successful in all other fields of medicine. The psychological group follows a road which is radically distinct, in that it seeks to construct causal explanations out of the stuff of subjective experience. Its claim to be permitted to attempt such causal explanations is no less justified than that of the physiological group. From the standpoint of science we are only entitled to demand that the conceptions employed shall be reached by the method of science, and that they shall satisfy the ultimate pragmatic test. That is to say, they must, in fact, furnish an explanation of the phenomena with which they deal, and enable us to predict and control those phenomena. It is impossible here to consider how far the various psychological schools have succeeded in satisfying this pragmatic test, but it can hardly be denied to-day that they have achieved a measure of progress which at least justifies further effort.
When we survey all these various roads, some parallel and some divergent, along which psychiatry is struggling to advance, the question may perhaps be asked, " Which of these roads is the right one ?" There is of course no answer to so preposterous a question1 although it is frequently answered with the utmost assurance by enthusiastic but imperfectly educated members of all schools. Science is an attempt to interpret our experience by the aid of a particular method, and each individual science is permitted to employ its own conceptions and to attack as much of our experience as it can, provided only that it adheres to the fundamental rules of the method. It is absurd to suppose that any science has the right to pre-empt a particular sphere of experience and to warn other investigators from trespassing thereon. The psychologist can legitimately become indignant if he is denied access to the phenomena of psychiatry at the hands of somephysiological or chemical panacea-monger, but he must also admit without question the right of the physiologist and chemist to push their conceptions as far as they can be made to go, and to attempt the interpretation of any and every problem which psychiatry presents. The fallacy of "eitberor" so far as the approaches to psychiatry are concerned must be strenuously combated, and every method of approach must be given a free hand.
It is of course reasonable to inquire whether one method of approach can be regarded as more promising than another, though it will be difficult to obtain an answer which is not conditioned by the traditions,habits of thought, and prejudices of the man who gives it. In the present state of our knowledge such an answer can only be properly based upon the pragmatic test. Which method is the most serviceable in enabling us to understand, to predict, and to control the phenomena of psychiatry? The psychologist can claim that his method, if assessed by this test, has at the present time indubitably achieved greater success than any other method so far as the psychoneuroses are concerned, and perhaps not much less success in the sphere of the psychoses. The neurologist, physiologist, and chemist, on the other hand, can claim that, even if they have not as much immediate practical fruit to offer as the psychologist, they are proceeding by objective methods of proved value in all other spheres of medicine, and that they have always before them the desirable goal of bringing the phenomena of psychiatry into line with a great mass of already established knowledge, extending over fields which psychology is apparently incapable of attacking at all. They may claim, moreover, that the method of psychology has intrinsic imperfections which necessarily make it inferior to the weapons possessed by other sciences. Its conceptions cannot be so adequately tested by a constant resort to objective observations, and those observations are themselves liable to numerous subjective and distorting factors which play but little part in other methods of investigation. These obstacles are no doubt very real ones, but they should furnish rather a spur to the psychologist to improve his weapons than an indication to discard them as forever useless.
The attitude of tolerance can be applied, not only to the major question of the respective claims of the psychological and physiological methods of approach, but also to the divergencies which exist within the psychological method itself. We have seen that Freud, Adler and Jung put forward interpretations of the phenomena of psychiatry which are apparently radically distinct from one another, and yet that each succeeds in illuminating some facets of those phenomena more satisfactorily than his rivals. An analogy to this state of affairs can be found in the history of the theories of light. Newton's corpuscular hypothesis explained many of the phenomena of light; it was replaced by Young's undulatory hypothesis which explained most of ths phenomena more efficiently, though some remained more comprehensible on Newton's view. These two conceptions were radically distinct and apparently incompatible, yet modern physics has succeeded by the aid of the theory of wave-mechanics in incorporating these apparent incompatibles in a single unifying conception, and holds that a beam of light consists of discrete " light quanta," which are at once corpuscles and waves. Such a happy fate may await the divergent approaches of the rival psychologists of to-day. At any rate it is reasonable to ask each school to push its conceptions as far as they will go, and not to discard them merely because they fail to explain certain phenomena, but only if phenomena are found which directly contradict them.
Although science allows each of its members to play freely in its own ground, this permit is not of course to be regarded as necessarily perpetual. On the contrary there is a constant search for wider generalizations u hich will resume a number of conceptions only applicable to smaller spheres, and an endeavour to incorporate the findings of the newer sciences in the more universal formulw of the older sciences. Biology and physiology strive to express their laws in terms of the wider concepts of physics and chemistry, while physics and chemistry themselves have already largely succeeded in reducing their own concepts to the formule of mathematics. There would therefore seem to be good ground for hoping that we shall be able in the future to express the conceptions of psychology in terms of the wider conceptions of physiology, later in the still wider formulw, of physics and chemistry, and perhaps ultimately in the universal formulm of mathematics. This hope is, indeed, widely held, and a multitude of workers are fighting to achieve its realization. We shall not question its legitimacy as a goal towards which we should press forward so far as progress proves to be possible, but it is by no means inconceivable that at some point ahead we shall find the road absolutely blocked. There are certain conceptions forming an integral part of the psychological approach,' "purpose" for example, which seem altogether resistant to any attempt to incorporate them in the framework of mechanistic science. Further, the essential feature of the sequences dealt with by mechanistic science is that they are reversible, effect is cause in a new form and can be brought back again to its original form. The sequences, not only of psychology but also those of biology, appear to be essentially irreversible, and this feature again seems likely to "stick out" however far we may progress in our efforts to reduce the processes of psychology and biology to those of physics and chemistry. It may reasonably be maintained, therefore, that it will always prove impossible completely to subsume psychology under the concepts of mechanistic science, although this does not in the least mean that psychology cannot remain a science. For the essence of science is simply the employment of a certain method: mechanism is not synonymous with science, but is only one avenue which science has found to be extraordinarily fruitful in dealing with some of the phenomena of nature.
DEC.-PSYCH. 2 * These considerations lead to some interesting speculations. It has been pointed out that the physiologist is trying to reduce his conceptions to those of chemistry and physics, while the psychologist seeks to interpret his findings in terms of physiology. We have here the picture of a procession, with the physicist and chemist in the van, and the psychologist in the rear, each member of the procession pushing always to get as near to the front as possible. Now it is well that the psychologist, who may feel that his only hope is to follow rigidly the road which the procession has taken, should inquire occasionally as to what is taking place at the van. If he makes such an inquiry at the present time he will discover that some remarkable evolutions are occurring in the foremost ranks. The physicist of to-day, so far from upholding mechanistic science as the be-all and end-all of knowledge, is abandoning mechanism. He tends to regard it as a step which has been useful as a temporary aid to advancement, but which is now beginning to fail him, and whose validity as a universal and ultimate weapon of understanding can be definitely disproved.
When the psychologist hears news of this kind from the front, and learns that mechanism, upon which he has been told to base all his hopes of ultimate salvation, has been found wanting in its very stronghold, he must surely hesitate before accepting this as the only road along which he can travel. But some of the evolutions at the front are of an even more remarkable character. Sir James Jeans says that: " To-day there is a wide measure of agreement, which on the physical side of science approaches almost to unanimity, that the stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality, the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine. Mind no longer appears as an accidental intruder into the realm of matter; we are beginning to suspect that we ought rather to hail it as the creator and governor of the realm of matter .So it looks as if we may have to amend our picture of the procession into an almost Gilbertian shape. The wheel comes full-circle and the psychologist, struggling perspiringly in the hope that he may ultimately attain to the van of the procession, finds that van already treading on his heels.
Whatever validity these speculations may have, it is of course still possible to maintain that the psychologist can only advance along the road which other sciences have travelled, and that he must pass through the stage of mechanistic conceptions in order to leave it behind him. It may be admitted, indeed, that an endeavour to advance in this way is altogether laudable, but the considerations just adduced, and the obstinate resistance of psychological phenomena to fit even moderately comfortably into the framework of mechanism, at least justify the belief that other avenues of approach are worthy of effort.
We may be permitted one further speculation of perhaps an even wilder character.
The main psychological attack upon psychiatry has adhered whole-heartedly to the method of science, and has claimed therein its entire justification. Now it is possible that the method of science will ultimately prove to be an imperfect weapon for the psychologist, and that some other approach will have to be used before any completely adequate understanding of mental phenomena can be attained. That is to say, the psychologist, when he has reached a certain point, may find further progress impossible unless he discards, not only mechanistic science, but the method of science itself. Such a position, indeed, has been frankly adopted by Jung, and this circumstance underlies the accusation of mysticism levelled at him by his scientific critics. This accusation is perhaps unfairly expressed, but they may reasonably charg,e him with being non-scientific.
In order to appraise a speculation of this kind it is necessary in the first place to realize that the method of science is not an unique, absolute, and unimpeachable key to knowledge. No responsible scientist would, of course, dream of making such a claim. The method of science is merely a particular system of attack which has proved astonishingly successful in enabling us to understand and control our experience. It has been so successful, indeed, that we are in danger of worshipping it as an absolute god, and forgetting that it is only a convenient and most efficient weapon. Obviously it is entitled to far greater respect than any other weapon yet devised, but it is quite gratuitous to suppose that it is the only possible weapon, or that it will necessarily be able to solve all the problems which our experience presents.
We may get some further light here by considering again what is happening at the frontiers of physics. Advance there has been achieved by interpreting the laws discovered by inductive science in the terms of mathematics, and it is in this process that the concepts of causation and determinism have been dethroned from their formerly unquestioned supremacy, because mathematics has been able to find formulations which to some extent are incompatible with those concepts, but nevertheless describe our experience more successfully than their predecessors. Jeans remarks that ' our remote ancestors tried to interpret nature in terms of anthropomorphic concepts of their own creation, and failed. The efforts of our nearer ancestors to interpret nature on engineering lines have proved equally inadequate. Nature has refused to accommodate herself to either of these man-made moulds. On the other hand, our efforts to interpret nature in terms of the concepts of pure mathematics have, so far, proved brilliantly successful. It would seem to be beyond dispute that in some way nature is more closely allied to the concepts of pure mathematics than to those of biology or of engineering. .
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Now, it must be pointed out that pure mathematics is not science at all in the sense in which we have been using the term in this address. More accurately, it is not inductive science. Its concepts are not reached by the method of science we have described, that is, by the observation of facts and the construction of conceptions to explain those facts. On the contrary, "our mathematicians have formulated them in their studies, out of their own inner consciousness, and without drawing to any appreciable extent on their experience of the outer world."' It would seem, therefore, that at the head of the procession we have depicted the advance guard is passing out beyond the sphere of inductive science, and into a sphere where a method of totally different character is employed. Obviously, this latter sphere has only been reached by climbing laboriously up all the steps which the method of science has been able to furnish, and it is likely that the great majority of the sciences at present occupying places further back in the procession will have to proceed by the same road. It is more than possible, indeed, that the lamentable laggard psychology will also find here the only satisfactory route, but it cannot be maintained that this must quite certainly be its fate. For it must be remembered that the phenomena of psychology have characters sharply distinguishing them from the phenomena with which inductive science has mainly been concerned, that they offer peculiar resistances to incorporation in the framework of inductive science, and that psychology has at least some reason to question the complete applicability to itself of the concepts of causation and determinism which govern the march forward of inductive science. Moreover, the sphere into which the advance guard is moving, and the formulations which are being developed there, seem to have a colouring akin to the stuff of psychology. It is not therefore remotely incredible that psychology may find, if not a short cut, at any rate an alternative road, and that it may have to call to its aid other weapons than the method of science.
We may now leave this region of airy speculation, carrying with us such profit as we have been able to obtain, and endeavour in a final summary to regain contact with our main problem, the relation of psychology to psychiatry. Psychiatry is Proceedings of the Royal Society oj Medicine being attacked along a multitude of routes. In some of these psychology plays no part whatever: here the physical phenomena accompanying mental disorder are alone considered, and the attack proceeds by the aid of neurology, physiology, and chemistry. In others psychology is allowed to give a helping hand at a purely descriptive level, but the search for causal conceptions is left entirely in the hands of other sciences. In a third group these causal conceptions are sought within the sphere of psychology itself, but the endeavour is made to employ only the method of science and to construct only such conceptions as conform to the canons of that method. Finally, a fourth group, which at present can hardly be said to be more than nascent, is prepared to consider the possibility that a psychology limited to the method of science may never be able to solve all the problems that psychiatry presents, and that appeal will have to be made to some other weapon. The scientist may reasonably regard this last group as building upon shifting sands and rankly heretical, but it is well to remember that past heresies have sometimes become the orthodoxies of later ages.
The aim of this address has been to show that no one of these approaches can claim an exclusive divine mission to govern psychiatry. All of them can claim the right to push their conceptions as far as they will go; it is patent that each and every one of them has achieved success in illuminating some facets of the complex problem which psychiatry offers to us, and may reasonably hope both to increase the illumination and to extend it to other facets. The formulations which will embrace all the facets in comprehensive generalizations obviously lie very far ahead, and it is more than probable that none of the roads now known to us will ever succeed in bringing us there. At the moment we can only ask the neurologist, the physiologist, the chemist and the psychologist, to give us all the help they can, and we must not be disturbed because their various interpretations proceed along divergent paths and seem impossible to reconcile in any coherent picture. With our knowledge of to-day it would be absurd to expect such a reconciliation. The history of science leads us to hope, however, that when such a happy issue does occur, it will be found that the stones laid down by the efforts of workers along all these divergent paths have contributed to build the steps by which the ultimate and comprehensive concepts have-finally been reached.
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